訪頂尖歐洲智庫學者：歐盟碳市場的兩大挑戰和運行經驗

全國碳市場啓動漸行漸近。據生態環境部此前介紹，全國碳市場擬於6月底前啓動上線交易，而現在距離6月結束還剩6天。

目前，交易系統已順利通過技術驗收，全國碳市場上線只差臨門一腳。但是國內學術界對於碳市場應該着重凸顯哪些功能、碳價及其調控等細節問題尚有分歧，人們對於碳減排行動對經濟和福利可能造成的影響還存在疑問。從全球範圍來看，要有效推動全球共同減排，對碳邊境調節稅和全球統一碳市場的討論也不可避免。

CF40研究部邀請到歐洲碳交易體系研究專家、歐洲布魯蓋爾研究所（Bruegel）高級研究員喬治·扎克曼（Georg Zachmann），對歐盟碳交易經驗和目前遇到的挑戰進行介紹，並就上述國際熱點問題分享見解。

Georg Zachmann本人長期致力於歐洲排放交易體系、歐洲電力市場和歐洲可再生能源政策的研究。在加入布魯蓋爾研究所之前，他還曾在德國財政部和德國經濟研究所（the German Institute for Economic Research）工作。

Bruegel成立於2005年，位於比利時布魯塞爾，是國際頂級經濟政策智庫之一。歐洲能源和氣候問題是其重點研究方向之一。

Georg Zachmann表示，碳減排需要整個經濟實現重大轉型，這需要大力投資低碳技術，同時，重排放的煤礦、燃煤電廠等行業需要轉型或者淘汰。但是，氣候政策對經濟社會產生的衝擊可能並不會像自動化、數字化等技術變革的影響那麼大。長期來看，探索新機遇比保護傳統行業就業更重要。

歐盟碳市場一直是全球各國碳市場建設的標杆。然而新冠疫情以來，歐洲碳價在短暫下跌後大幅上漲。今年5月下旬，歐洲碳價一度漲超56歐元/噸，較年初上漲超50%，引發歐洲一些行業對碳價過高的不滿；一些國內專家也對高碳價提出異議。

Georg Zachmann認為，目前歐盟碳定價機制運作良好，價格波動是合理的。歐盟碳市場當前的挑戰一是如何將更多的行業納入碳定價機制中，如運輸和熱力；二是碳價的上升遭到了來自行業的阻力，因為企業不希望自己的國際競爭力因為碳價上升而受到削弱；消費者因為擔心可支配收入下降，也不願意支付更高的碳價。

他建議，對於前者，可以針對這些行業再推出一個碳排放交易系統，之後再與現有的系統合併。對於後者，「政策制定者可能會給出一個彈性區間，當碳價超出了政策可接受的範圍時，就對每年發放的補貼金額進行調整，但調整的方式要具有可預見性。」

「這樣一來，交易中碳價可以升得很高、或降得很低，但必要時政策會對價格進行逆向干預，以增強碳價的可預測性、避免價格過度波動。」他説。

IMF發佈的報告顯示，要實現全球變暖控制在2攝氏度以內的目標，2030年碳價應達到75美元/噸，甚至更高。然而，2019年，全球平均碳價僅為2美元/噸，即便目前的歐洲碳價也未達到這一水平。

設計出一個激勵相容的機制以使全球朝着碳中和的方向共同努力，對於碳減排非常重要，但就機制本身而言，各國遠未達成共識。

今年3月，歐洲議會通過了「碳邊境調節機制」（CBAM）議案，稱如果一些與歐盟有貿易往來的國家不能遵守碳排放相關規定，歐盟將對這些國家進口商品徵收碳關稅。歐盟希望這一機制有助於提高歐盟內部的碳價格，並提升歐盟以外國家的氣候雄心。但是，國際上也對這一措施帶有的貿易保護主義色彩提出質疑。

如果將經濟脆弱國家考慮進來，碳關稅真的有利於推動全球共同減排嗎？

Georg Zachmann表示，試圖通過CBAM促使其他國家推出氣候政策是行不通的，容易因有越俎代庖之嫌而受到詬病。但是從政治現實來看，只能儘可能合理地設計碳邊境調節機制、避免對國際貿易造成太大傷害。我們要嚴肅看待歐盟目前推動的這個機制、積極有效應對。貿易伙伴應該劃出清晰且切合實際的紅線，讓歐盟找到一個普遍接受的解決方案。

他認為，碳邊境調節收入不應計入財政收支，建立一種將碳邊境調節收入退回出口國的機制，可能是法律風險最小的做法，但是，更有吸引力的選擇可能是把這筆收入用於海外氣候投資，這從法律上也是可行的。

為促進全球共同減排，建設全球統一的碳市場也是國際上熱議的方案之一，但目前尚未見到可行路徑。

中國金融學會會長、中國人民銀行原行長周小川在5月9日舉行的「2060展望碳中和：能源、技術與投資」交流會上提出，可以試着換一種思路和做法，學習中國金融市場的做法，建立類似滬港通、深港通等機制，把各個碳市場進行市場可控的連通。從起步來講，應該允許發展中國家每年有一定數量的負值碳配額拿到歐洲碳市場去賣。

Georg Zachmann認為，由於涉及分配和主權問題，短期內很難建設一個全球性的碳定價體系。採取一種更加分散的方式進行跨境碳交易更加可行，但這種方法要想奏效，購買碳排放權的國家所買的必須是賣出國「額外」的碳排放權。這就需要我們探索一種方法，準確評估所交易碳排放權的 「額外性」 （additionality）。

他強調，碳定價從經濟上來説確實是最有效的促進碳減排的辦法，但對於碳減排來説也並非不可或缺。

要推動全球共同努力，應該從既有機制入手，逐步強化聯合國氣候變化框架公約（UNFCCC）提供的工具，如氣候融資、技術轉移等，切實激勵欠發達國家越過高碳排放的發展階段，直接邁入使用可再生能源、發展可持續交通與工業的階段，並逐步降低低碳技術的成本、增強其競爭力，讓欠發達國家也能應用和推廣這些技術。

他還表示，中國的氣候政策非常積極，但是和很多國家一樣，現實比理想複雜得多。從歐洲的角度來看，中國如果能夠和歐洲共同探討如何解決碳泄漏的問題，會非常有幫助。

訪談實錄

1、人們對碳減排行動可能造成的經濟和福利的損失較為擔心，比如產業轉型可能造成失業、含碳產品成本抬升、通脹抬升等。您認為應該如何正確看待並回應這個問題？

Georg Zachmann：碳減排需要整個經濟實現重大轉型，我們要改變出行、供暖、生產、發電方式等，這需要大力投資於低碳技術，如電動汽車、電熱、風力渦輪機和太陽能電池板。同時，重排放的煤礦、燃煤電廠等行業需要轉型或者淘汰。

這樣的重大轉型對經濟社會造成什麼影響很大程度上取決於政策選擇。通過公共補貼來激勵低碳轉型成本會非常高昂；僅僅依賴提高碳定價來減排會抬高消費者和行業的成本；僅靠制定和實施一些標準則效率太低。因此，政策制定者需要平衡多種政策，切實有效地推進低碳轉型，例如，可以實施市場化的碳排放總量控制交易機制（cap-and-trade）、減少財政補貼，同時採取激勵措施，推動企業與消費者加大低碳技術投資，降低碳排放，避免碳價升得過高。

氣候政策對經濟社會產生的衝擊可能不會像自動化、數字化等技術變革的影響那麼大，但政府還是要積極應對相關的區域性、行業性挑戰。長期來看，探索新機遇比保護傳統行業就業更重要。

2、目前看來，中國打算從建立全國碳市場入手，以市場化機制推動碳達峯和碳中和的實現。能否請您回顧一下歐洲碳市場的擬建和運行歷程？並談一談，其中有哪些值得借鑑的經驗和需要吸取的教訓？

Georg Zachmann：歐盟碳排放交易體系非常成功，在30個歐洲國家實行統一的碳價，這在經濟上非常高效。

歐盟碳市場已經成為了歐盟氣候政策的基石。但歐盟碳市場一開始的建設並不容易。最初，很多學者和政策制定者更希望歐盟對碳排放徵稅，即由政府確定碳價，而不是推出碳排放限額交易系統、由政府來制定碳排放配額。但是根據歐盟的政治架構，所有成員國在稅收問題上都有一票否決權，所以在歐盟各國徵收統一的碳稅未能實現。

在歐盟碳市場推出的前幾年，很多公司因為政府發放的免費碳排放補貼獲得了大量的額外收益，碳排放配額的過度分配也遏制了碳價。但這些缺陷很可能是政策制定者有意為之，目的是為碳市場爭取足夠的政治支持。

之後，歐盟碳排放交易體系的規則幾經修訂，現在這些問題大多得到了解決。歐盟碳市場已經相對成熟，逐步提高的碳定價也正在鼓勵更多的低碳轉型，如淘汰煤炭發電等。

3、近期歐洲碳交易價格的攀升，引發了一些對當前碳價「過高」還是「不足」，以及碳價穩定性的討論。您認為，當前歐洲碳價及其形成面臨的真正問題是什麼？對待碳價，經濟體應該允許其不斷上漲，還是有必要在不同階段確定對應的合理碳價區間？可行做法是什麼？

Georg Zachmann：歐盟碳定價機制目前運作良好。歐盟現在面臨的挑戰是如何將更多的行業納入碳定價機制中，如運輸和熱力。我們或許可以針對這些行業再推出一個碳排放交易系統，之後再與現有的系統合併。

另一個挑戰是碳價的上升遭到了來自行業的阻力，背後的原因也可以理解，因為企業不希望自己的國際競爭力因為碳價上升而受到削弱；同時，消費者因為擔心可支配收入下降，也不願意支付更高的碳價。妥善應對這些問題是保證碳定價機制正常運作的政治基礎。

從政治的角度，我們可以提供關於可接受價格水平的指引，這有利於平息那些反對價格合理波動的聲音。比起以間接方式引導市場，直接指定一個具體的碳價區間可能會面臨更多的政治阻力。

我認為政策制定者可能會給出一個彈性區間，當碳價超出了政策可接受的範圍時，就對每年發放的補貼金額進行調整，但調整的方式要具有可預見性。這樣一來，交易中碳價可以升得很高、或降得很低，但必要時政策會對價格進行逆向干預，以增強碳價的可預測性、避免價格過度波動。

4、碳市場和碳定價應有的功能是什麼？對於實現碳中和能在多大程度上起到作用？除此之外，一國要實現碳中和還需哪些其他政策安排？

Georg Zachmann：碳定價可以為碳密集型技術的經營者和投資者提供強有力的、清晰的價格信號，鼓勵經營者儘可能少用煤電廠等高碳資產、選擇其他的替代資產，引導投資者不再投資於平爐等高碳資產。因此，碳定價機制要儘可能覆蓋那些最重要的高排放領域，讓企業為自己的碳排放承擔成本，讓價格信號在短期和長期內都足夠有力、可信。此外，還有很多配套政策能夠讓碳定價更有效、政治上更好被接受，如支持低碳技術發展、提供社會補貼等。

5、要使全球朝着碳中和的方向共同努力，是否有必要設計出一個激勵相容的機制？你認為可行的做法有哪些？

Georg Zachmann：這個問題對於碳減排非常重要。雖然探討這個問題的學術文獻汗牛充棟，但目前我們就此尚未達成學術共識。

我認為我們應該從既有機制入手，即聯合國氣候變化框架公約（UNFCCC）下的巴黎氣候協定。我們應逐步強化UNFCCC提供的工具，如氣候融資、技術轉移等，切實激勵欠發達國家越過高碳排放的發展階段，直接邁入使用可再生能源、發展可持續交通與工業的階段。通過加大對低碳技術研究、創新、展示與應用的公共支持力度，我們能夠逐步降低低碳技術的成本、增強其競爭力，讓欠發達國家也能應用和推廣這些技術。

6、如果把經濟脆弱國家納入考慮，碳邊境調節稅對於在全球範圍實現碳中和是有利的嗎？它可能有哪些正面和負面影響？

Georg Zachmann：最理想的情況是，我們設計了碳邊境調節機制，但永遠不會實施。比如，如果出口國能夠在國內推廣碳定價，進口國就不用實施碳邊境調節了。這一方面有利於進口國追求更高的氣候目標，另一方面，出口國也不必繳納碳關稅了。

最糟糕的情況是，碳邊境調節機制的合法性和公平性面臨質疑，加劇經濟風險、拖累碳減排進程，甚至可能引發貿易戰。為了避免這種情況發生，進口國和出口國雙方都需要高超的外交技巧。

7、如何設計實施碳邊境調節機制才能既避免貿易保護主義，激發貿易戰，又有利於全球共同碳減排？在相同目的下，有其他更好的替代方案嗎？

Georg Zachmann：我認為試圖通過碳邊境調節機制促使其他國家推出氣候政策是行不通的，容易因有越俎代庖之嫌而受到詬病。

我能想到兩種替代方案。第一，對在一國消費的產品，不管是國內生產的還是從國外進口的，全都徵收碳消費稅，但是考慮到歐盟的政治架構，這需要所有成員國一致投票通過，這一方案的落實有難度；第二，對低碳技術提供強有力的支持，讓本國的綠色生產具有足夠的競爭力，這樣就不用訴諸邊境調節稅，同時還能促進技術發展。

不過，從政治現實來看，我們只能儘可能合理的設計碳邊境調節機制、避免對國際貿易造成太大傷害。因此，我們要嚴肅看待歐盟目前推動的這個機制、積極有效應對。貿易伙伴應該明確一些現實的紅線，給歐盟留出空間，探索出一個為各方普遍接受的方案。

8、您認為，碳邊境調節稅收應該用在何處？有觀點認為，為避免稅收被挪用，並加強對發展中國家的支持，應該全部用於購買發展中國家出口的負值碳配額，也就是用於支持發展中國家或者具體出口國的減排行動。您對此是否贊同？

Georg Zachmann：我認為碳邊境調節收入不應計入財政收支，因為這有可能讓人覺得它不是一個氣候工具，而是政治工具。從法律的角度來説，最安全的辦法是建立一種機制，將碳邊境調節收入退回出口國；但如果把這筆收入用於海外氣候投資從法律上可行，這不失為一個有吸引力的選擇。

9、建立全球統一的碳定價體系是否有必要性和可行性？有人提出了替代方案——在各個碳市場之間建立可控的連通機制。您的建議是什麼？

Georg Zachmann：我認為短期內很難建設一個全球性的碳定價體系，這其中涉及的分配和主權問題會構成很大的障礙。而且，雖然碳定價從經濟上來説確實是最有效的促進碳減排的辦法，我並不認為它對於碳減排來説是不可或缺的。

採取一種更加分散的方式進行跨境碳交易更加可行，從經濟的角度看方法合理，甚至有望為欠發達國家提供更多的低碳投資。但這種方法要想奏效，購買碳排放權的國家所買的必須是賣出國「額外」的碳排放權。這就需要我們探索一種方法，準確評估所交易碳排放權的 「額外性」 （additionality）。

10、中國提出在2030年實現碳達峯，2060年實現碳中和，您對中國政府在設計和實施政策時有哪些建議？

Georg Zachmann：中國的氣候政策非常積極，包括承諾2060年實現碳中和、快速推廣可再生能源發電、開發低碳新技術、推出碳排放交易市場等，這些都是很好的舉措。但是和很多國家一樣，現實比理想複雜得多。從歐洲的角度來看，中國如果能夠和歐洲共同探討如何解決碳泄漏的問題，會非常有幫助。如果這個問題得到妥善解決，不僅可以遏制歐洲以外其他國家的碳排放增長，也能夠幫助歐洲更好地減排，從而有利於全球碳減排目標的達成。

英文實錄

1. Some people worry that decarbonization could have negative impacts on the economy and social welfare, such as job loss caused by industrial upgrade, higher cost of carbon products, and rising inflation. How should we assess these impacts and address the problems?

Georg Zachmann：Decarbonisation will require a substantial transformation of our economy. We will have to change the way we move around, heat our homes, produce our goods and generate electricity. This will require substantial investments in low carbon technology such as electric vehicles, electric heating, as well as wind turbines and solar panels. At the same time, some emission intensive sectors, such as coal mines and coal-fired power plants, will have to change or even disappear. The impact that this massive transformation will have on people will, to a large degree, depend on political choices. Incentivising the transition mainly by public subsidies would be prohibitively expensive; relying only on high carbon prices would be a fiscal shock to consumers and industry; and using only standards would be very inefficient. Hence, policy-makers need to come up with a balanced menu of policies that ensures the transition is happening – e.g., by implementing a cap-and-trade system with decreasing issuance of allowances – but also incentivises companies and consumers to invest in new low-carbon technologies to avoid increasing carbon prices. While the disruption from climate policies might not be much bigger than other technology-driven disruptions – such as automation and digitalization – governments still need to address the associated regional and sectoral hardships. In the long term, creating new opportunities is better than protecting old jobs.

2. China plans to realize the 2030/60 goals via market-based mechanisms starting with the national carbon market. Could you give us a brief introduction to the history of the EU-ETS, including how it was initiated and developed? What are the experiences and lessons that other countries could learn from the EU?

Georg Zachmann：The EU ETS is a significant success – having 30 European countries under one single carbon price is economically efficient and the system has become the cornerstone of the EU』s climate policy. The start was, however, not easy. Many academics and policy-makers would have preferred if the EU would have introduced a carbon tax (where the government determines the carbon price) instead of a cap-and-trade system (where the government determines a volume of emissions). But the political architecture of the EU – where each member state has a veto on taxation issues - did not allow for a Europe-wide tax to be introduced. In the first years, free allowances to companies allowed significant windfall profits to corporates, and overallocation depressed prices. These issues might well have been deliberate imperfections to ensure enough political support for the system. The system』s rules have been updated several times and these initial issues have now been largely corrected. The system now has teeth, and increasing carbon prices are encouraging, for example, a speed up of the transition away from coal fired power generation.

3. The recent rise in carbon price in Europe has triggered discussions on the appropriate level and stability of the price.

(1) In your understanding, what is the major problem with carbon pricing in Europe?

Georg Zachmann：Carbon pricing in the EU is working well. The challenge now is to extend it to sectors that are not yet covered, such as transport and heating. This will possibly be done through a second cap-and-trade system that might, over time, be merged with the existing system. Another challenge is that increasing carbon prices face understandable opposition from industry –worried about its international competitiveness – and from consumers who worry about a drop in disposable income. Finding solutions to address these concerns is crucial to avoid politically derailing the system.

(2) How should the carbon price be regulated? Should it be allowed to keep rising, or should it be contained within an appropriate range? How to determine this range and keep the price within it?

Georg Zachmann：Providing political guidance on what price level is politically acceptable might be useful; namely to mute opposition against acceptable price movements. But fixing a concrete range will be politically more difficult than guiding market dynamics in a more indirect way. I believe that policymakers might introduce some forms of 「elastic bands」 that change the annual issuance of allowances when prices go beyond the boundaries of what was determined as politically acceptable, but in a predictable way. This would imply that prices can still reach very high/low levels if this is what is needed to meet the cap, but the system would start to lean against the wind – increasing predictability and avoiding excess volatility.

4. What functions should the carbon market and carbon pricing mechanism have? To what extent can they promote carbon neutrality？What other policies should be in place to achieve carbon neutrality?

Georg Zachmann：Carbon pricing should provide strong and clear price signals to operators of and investors in carbon intensive technologies. Operators should be encouraged to explore their carbon intensive assets (such as coal plants) less when alternatives are available. The carbon price should encourage investors to not finance new carbon intensive assets (such as open hearth furnaces). Accordingly, it is important that most important emissions are covered, that companies cannot avoid carbon pricing, and that the price signal is robust and credible in the short and long term.

There are many complimentary policies that increase the effectiveness and political acceptability of carbon pricing, such as support for low carbon technologies and social compensations.

5. For countries to work together towards carbon neutrality, do we need an incentive-compatible mechanism? How can we build such a mechanism?

Georg Zachmann：Like all your questions, this is a very important one for decarbonisation, and also one on which there is no academic consensus - hundreds of scholars have written thousands of books on the topic. My take would be that we should work with what we have – the UNFCCC process that culminated in the Paris Agreement. We should gradually strengthen the instruments it provides, such as climate finance and technology transfer, in a way that creates true incentives for less developed countries leap-frog the high-emissions development phase and directly move to renewable energy and sustainable transport and industry. In particular, I believe that public support to research, innovation, demonstration and deployment of low carbon technologies can bring about the general cost degressions needed to make these technologies competitive, even in less developed countries.

6. The European Parliament passed a resolution to support the introduction of the cross-border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), planning to impose a border adjustment tax to prevent carbon transfer and leakage and protect local industries』 competitiveness. However, some countries have considered this proposal to be protectionist.

(1) Fragile economies taken into account, will border adjustment tax facilitate carbon neutrality around the globe? What are the positive and negative influences it might have?

Georg Zachmann：At best, a CBAM will be devised but never be used. If, for example, exporter countries introduce domestic carbon pricing, importer countries will not impose carbon border adjustments. This would have the double benefit of allowing importer countries to pursue higher climate ambition, and allowing exporter countries to avoid paying any adjustments.

At worst, disputes about the legality and fairness of a CBAM lead to high economic uncertainty, delayed decarbonization and possibly even to an intense trade-war. Avoiding this outcome will require diplomatic skills on both sides.

(2) How to design the cross-border adjustment mechanism so that it could promote global carbon reduction while preventing trade protectionism and trade wars? Are there better ways to achieve this goal?

Georg Zachmann：I think that using CBAM to push other countries to introduce climate policies is set to fail as it can be perceived as an overreach. Two alternative approaches come to mind. One would be applying domestic carbon consumption taxes on all goods, both domestically produced and imported. This would, however, be difficult for the EU political architecture, as it requires a unanimous vote on taxation. The second alternative would be to aggressively support low carbon alternatives. This could make domestic green production competitive without having to resort to any border adjustment, and it would, at the same time, promote technology development.

Still, I think the political reality is that we will have to find a way to devise a CBAM mechanism that does not do too much harm. Thus the discussion on the current European proposal should be taken seriously and be reacted to constructively. Trade partners should trace clear, but realistic, red lines and allow the EU to find a commonly acceptable solution.

(3) In your view, how should revenue from the border adjustment tax be used? Some think all the revenue should be used to purchase negative carbon quotas from developing countries to support their carbon reduction effort and avoid misuse. Do you agree with this?

Georg Zachmann：I agree that CBAM revenues should not be put into the budget as this increases the risk of them being perceived as a political – rather than a climate - tool. I presume a mechanical way of returning the money to the exporting country might be the least likely to be legally challenged – but if using CBAM revenues for sensible climate investments overseas is a legally feasible option, it would indeed be attractive.

7. Is it necessary and feasible to build a globally unified system for carbon pricing? Some have come up with an alternative solution— to develop controllable connections among different carbon markets. What is your take on this?

Georg Zachmann：I think that it will be very difficult to establish a global carbon pricing system anytime soon. The distributional and sovereignty issues involved might make it too hard to ever get there. And – despite being the most economically efficient solution - I am not convinced that it is ultimately needed to decarbonise. In my view, a more decentralised approach to carbon trading across borders is feasible, would be economically sensible, and can even serve to finance low-carbon investments in less developed countries. But this will only work if buyer countries can commit to only buying truly additional emission reductions from seller countries. Here, we would need to come up with a gold-standard for assessing the additionality of emission reductions.

8. Though China has proposed the 2030/60 goals, the country now still accounts for about one third of global carbon emission. While striving to deliver its commitments in due course, China has to balance decarbonization efforts with the need to maintain economic growth and stability. What advice would you give to the Chinese government in designing and implementing related policies?

Georg Zachmann：Chinese climate policy headlines are quite positive. Setting 2060 targets for net neutrality, fast deployment of renewable electricity generation, development of new low carbon technologies and introduction of an emission trading system sound very good. But I also observe that – like in most countries - the realities are more complicated. Moreover, it would be extremely useful, from a European perspective, if China could discuss with Europe how to jointly address European concerns about carbon leakage. If done well, this would not only prevent rising emissions outside Europe but also allow to increase European ambition and hence be very helpful for global decarbonization.